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IN DEFENSE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
PICKETING DOCTRINE

Loitis L. Jaffe*

P

ICKETING, pursued by state prohibition, has now found sanctuary in the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment recognizes
it as free speech. But not always, says the majority of the Court.
There has been sharp fire from both the Right and the Left. The
criticism runs much as it did against the Duke of York's generalship
of his men. "When they were half-way up they were neither up nor
down." In a recent article 1 Mr. Teller argues that picketing is not an
exercise of free speech and should never have been constitutionally
guaranteed as such. It was the first mistake of the Court that it did
just that. Then, having carried the fort, the majority led by Justice
Frankfurter fell back into a confused retreat which plunges into obscurity both the principle of protection and the principle of limitation.
Incidentally, it established a precedent that the constitutional protection of a civil liberty may be qualified. This is far worse than that
there be no protection at all. For Mr. Teller, half a loaf is worse than
none. Justice Frankfurter is in even greater discredit with a distinguished and powerful wing of his own brethren and the important
section of public opinion which it both leads and reflects. It is apparent
to Justice Douglas that picketing is essentially a coercive technique. Its
protection as free speech was necessarily a protection of its coercive
effect, and as free speech (and here the two critics join hands) it cannot
be qualified. Justice Frankfurter, in attempting qualification, either
did not understand the implications of his own decision in the Swing 2
case, or has not the courage to carry them through. Thus is the majority of the Court sadly boxed between two such traps of steely, inexorable logic. Yet there is a glimmer of comfort for the infralogical
mind in the fact that such strong logic can arrive at quite opposite
conclusions.
Let us address ourselves to Mr. Teller. Mr. Teller devotes him*Professor of Law, University of Buffalo. A.B., Johns Hopkins; LL.B., S.J.D.
Harvard. Author, JuoICIAL AsPECT OF FoREIGN AFFAIRS (1933) and numerous
articles in legal periodicals.-Ed.
.
1
"Picketing and Free Speech," 56 HARv. L. REv. 180 (1942). See in reply Dodd,
"Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 HARv. L. REv. 513 (1943), and Mr.
Teller's reply to Professor Dodd's article, 56 HARV. L. REv. 532 (1943).
2
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568 (1941).
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self first to the isolation of the simon-pure substance, free speech. It
is as if he had discovered the ninety-third element.
"Picketing is a form of economic pressure and not simply the
exercise of free speech," says Mr. Teller. "Rarely, if ever, does
labor inform the public of all the differences which exist between
it and the employer.... The picket appeals basically to sympathy;
sometimes, however, he appeals to the customer's sense of embarrassment .... This differs greatly from the classical notion of free
speech which places an abiding faith in the ability of the people
to decide wisely between alternative suggestions after discussion
and debate." 3
•
This simple chemical test for the presence of free speech is demonstrably naive. Justice Holmes in his great dissent in the Abrams 4 case
has, perhaps, given Mr. Teller his cue. In his J71asterful over-simplification, free speech is exalted as free competition •in ideas; its protection is the protection of an invaluable market in which the most worthwhile ideas drive out the inferior. That the best idea wins out in an
indeterminate future is a cherishable hope. Indeed, if we define reason
broadly enough to include all of the reasons which might legitimately
lead a man to embrace an idea or a course of action, we may say the
hope is often realized. But there can be no question that the nearer
an idea is to acceptance, the less likely is abstract ratiocination to be the
controlling factor: Discussion, in situations where it is most likely to
achieve its goal, is ordinarily but a thin veneer for the decisions and
orders of leadership. I have no intention: here to belittle the great
value of rational discussion. It is a vast educative force, a prime
solvent of social friction. But the implications of Mr. Teller's analysis
limit the scope of free speech far more narrowly than he intends. It
would come as.a great surprise to all of us, and no less to Mr. Teller,
to be told that the pronouncements of a union leader in a duly assem'bled meeting as to the whys and wherefores of a strike or a picketing
. were _not within the protection of free speech. Yet the appeal of such
speaking is hardly to the forces which decide a high school debate. It
is not the law that only ineffective minorities have the right of free
speech. In the Thornhill case5 Justice Murphy characterized picketing
as "free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes
l!Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 HARv.,L. REv. 180 ·at 204, 201,
202 (1942).
•
.
4 Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919).
5 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 at 103, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
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of labor dispute." Justice Frankfurter further fostered this illusion in
the Meadow-moor case 6 in which he traced back the protection of free
speech to eighteenth century "faith in the power of an appeal to reason
by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind" and implied
that normal picketing was no more than a type of such appeal. In this
piece of somewhat unrealistic analysis, he helped to lay the trap which
Justice Douglas improved. For the latter pointed out that even the
most peaceful picketing involved essentially coercive elements.7 He
· might have gone much further and demonstrated that the same is true
of a good part of what is formally free discussion.
Picketing, then, is not necessarily excluded from the area of free
speech because it is not "pure" speech. It still remains a question
whether picketing should be entitled to constitutional protection. I
think that the Court was right in deciding that it should be. But to my
mind it •is not inevitable doctrine. The trick has been to treat it as an
obvious, logically subsumed item of the simple hallowed formula of
free speech. Once that is achieved, it is easy to denounce as an attack
on the very Constitution itself any attempt to consider picketing realistically in its varying uses and manifestations. It might be argued that
picketing is an exercise of speech by the very definition that it tells or
says something about a given situation and appeals for or demands a
line of action to follow upon understanding of what is stated. But
Justice Douglas, to my mind, has presented the best argument as to
why on the contrary picketing might be treated as not within the protection for free speech. He has noted that
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very
presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another,
quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated." 8

In other words, being more than free speech, having as it were
an additional element, it might get no more protection than the additional element is entitled to.
It may appear that this suggestion is in complete contradiction to
what has been said against Mr. Teller's argument. His argument,
ii Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local No. 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S.
275 at 293, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
7 Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 62 S.
Ct. 816 (1941).
8 ld. 315 U.S. at 776.
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however, was simply that because it involves coercion picketing is not
free speech. Mr. Teller's line of reasoning involves the fallacy, particularly inappropriate for constitutional law, of assuming the existence
of categories to which the Constitution automatically does or does not
_apply. I suggest rather that the Court had considerable freedom as to
how it would classify or categorize picketing; that, indeed, this process
of classification, as the "confusion" of Justice Frankfurter attests, is
not yet complete. Picketing is in the words of Justice Douglas "more
than free speech." It is typically more than free speech and gains its
effects only incidentally from the function of speech as such. Situations
which may be so characterized are well-known to the law, e.g., inducement to breach of contract, disparagement of goods. These are cases
for which the free speech characterization has been both asserted and
denied.
There is a disposition today to pretend that the Court is not free
to create constitutional categories in the exercise of political judgment.
Most of the members of the present Court were among the severest
critics of the judges who created freedom of contract in the image of
their philosophy. It was the thesis of this criticism that the Court in
so doing transcended its political function, but I cannot help feeling
that it is hypocrisy to put entirely out of account that most of the
critics disagreed as well with the policies announced. This may not
have been true of Justice Holmes, but not even he desisted completely
from asserting canons and categories ·of protection not to be found in·
the Constitution. Thus, though he originally rejected the notion that
so-called extraterritorial exercises of power violated due process, he
was willing in the end to insist on the test of extraterritoriality in the
face of a contrary majority.9 He had come, I believe, to see this limitation on state power as implicit in the very concept of federalism.
Justice Brandeis, too, gave strong backing to the notion of extraterritoriality in a series of decisions protecting the right to use a defense
acquired abroad.10 The canon of a forbidden double taxation has now
been put, to utter rout and confusion,11 but there is at least Justice
9

Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 40 S. Ct. 2 (1919). In Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426, 46 S. Ct. 331 (1920), he wrote for the Court a
decision holding unconstitutional a state statute which required all fees for insurance
on domestic property to be paid to local agents. The Court has since distinguished
a statute in which one-half the fee must be paid to resident agents. Osborn v. Ozlin,
310 U.S. 53 at 65, 60 S. Ct. 758 (1940).
_
10
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 S. Ct. 338 (1930).
11
In State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 62 S. Ct. 1008
(1942).
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Jackson 12 ( to whom there attaches no taint of excessive reaction) who
believes that some such category must be retained in order to curb
excessive sectionalism. He has warned that the point wrll come. where
some concept perhaps of multiple taxation or of extraterritoriality will
be brought back for the occasion. When it does, we shall for the
moment not be told that these words are nowhere in the Constitution,
unless from the minority. Recently a very eloquent dissent 13 was
written to prove that impecunious persons on trial in state courts for
serious felony were entitled to have counsel provided. These judges
wished to make provision of counsel per se an element of due process.
They at least did not regard it as a sufficient answer that to date it had
not been so. A significant function, then, of the constitutional process
is the creation and destruction of categories within the broader constitutional notions.
The advocates of bare literalism, those who for the occasion can
find nothing stated in the Constitution which would justify the adoption of a sound national policy, are to my mind pretending to doctrine
which they cannot consistently pursue. Argument that the Court is
powerless to avert threatened evils and that the remedy is for Congress
may cover a decision that is otherwise sound, but the line of reasoning
is frequently disingenuous, particularly where it results in overruling
a line of decision whereby the Court did just that which it is now so
powerless to do. Justice Frankfurter in State Tax Commission v. Aldrich,14 opposing the thesis of Justice Jackson's dissent, says:
" ... To suggest that when this Court finds that a law is not
offensive to the Constitution and that it must therefore stand, we
make the same kind of judgment as when on rare occasions we
find that a law is offensive to the Constitution and must therefore
fall, is to disregard the role of this Court in our Constitutional
system since its establishment in 1789 ."

If this is taken to state a difference of degree it is no doubt true,
but I venture to suggest that whether for better or worse, the limitation of state and federal power, particularly the former, by the Court
--0ne need only think of Marshall-has been as significant as the
toleration. Even Holmes stated that the raison d'etre of the Supreme
Court was to limit state power. What both Marshall and Holmes had
in mind were the apparent minimum conditions of a federal system,
12

Id., 316 U.S. at 185.
ln Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252 (1942).
14
316 U.S. 174 at 185, 62 S. Ct. 1008 (1942).
18
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·an idea implied from the notion of the Constitution rather than stated
in so many words. No case, to my mind, proves this better than the
very category of protection which we are considering. There is nothing whatsoever in the Fourteenth Amendment protecting freedom of
speech, nor making its essence absolutely immune from state regulation. At one time Holmes himself did not know whether it was within
the Fourteenth Amendment.15 As it grew upon the judges that the
profoundly essential institution of free discussion must be preserved
from state interference, that its protection was a necessary condition of
national life, it found its way into the Fourteenth Amendment. This
is to the credit of the Supreme Court, but the credit is that having the
power to choose, they chose the path of wisdom.
And so my thesis is that from time to time the Court will be presented with occasions for including or excluding certain lines of activity
from the reach of the Constitution. It is not my intention to state that
the Court is free to enact as constitutional law any conceivable policy
which may seem necessary or appealing. I ,assume that the policy is
one which has at least a minimum logical connection with some constitutional provision. Furthermore, before exercising its powers of construction, it will observe the traditio~al cautions. The Court is the
least democratic organ of government. It will hesitate to find its policy
more valid than legislative policy, state or federal. The Court is the
least flexible organ of government. It can announce policy only piecemeal, case by case, and then only within the narrow confines of a judgment. The Court will hesitate to make fragmentary regulation where
regulation, if any, should be comprehensive, where.Congress is alone
apt for the task.16 But as Justice Jackson has protested, the latter argument often prefers a view only theoretically wise and statesmanlike to
a realistic one. The typical case is one where a state seeks to profit at
the expense of its neighbors by parochial tariffs and outreaching taxation schemes. These measures lead to retaliation and to an eventual
Balkanization of the economy. Justice Frankfurter has once told us
that where a great number_ of states seek to enrich themselves by destroying interstate business it is hardly for the courts to question the
constitutionality of so 'unanimous a democratic determination.11 The
15 In Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 27 S. Ct. 556 (1907). Harlan in
that case protested strongly against the failure of the Court to decide that free speech
was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
16 See Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, dissenting in McCarroll v. Dixie
Lines, 309 U. S. 176 at 183, 60 S. Ct. 504 (1940).
17 In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 at 65, 60 S. Ct. 758 (1940).
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more universal the parochialism the less is the claim for Union. If
anything is to be done, it is for Congress. But if these very antagonisms
do not equally block Congressional action, there remain the infinite
number and variety of schemes which no statute could quite encompass
or anticipate. John Marshall would never have helped build a Union
if he had been obsessed by a conviction of original inferiority. Our
latter-day judges have succumbed to the dogma. of Parliamentary
Omnicompetence. The Union still wants building; it will never cease
to want upkeep. There's still work for the judges.
It is at least part of the meaning of the Thornhill doctrine that the
judges were at this work of building; that labor was being given the
ultimate accolade of recognition as a national force. Traditionally the
Fourteenth Amendment has done service for and in the name of the
individual. This is true of free speech as it is of other freedoms; and
I would deplore any belittling of the tradition. Yet most individuals
realize their opportunities through group action. As this truth has wo11
its way into our thinking, we came to see not only individual but group
expression as a significant aspect of freedom. The Supreme Court
serves importantly, symbolically, to attest the national significance of
the group. The Supreme Court, as is true of the President and of
Congress, takes part in creating a minimum. national policy. For a time
it was the landowners, industrialists and merchants who got almost all
there was of the Fourteenth Amendment. But latterly labor has increased its share. The recognition of picketing as a constitutional category signalizes the maturing of the process.
" ... Illinois," said Justice Black in the li1.eadowmoor case,
"like all the other states of the Union, is part of a national
democratic system, the continued existence of which depends upon
the right of free discussion of public affairs-a right whose denial
to some leads in the direction of its eventual denial to all." 18
"Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of communication," 19
says Felix Frankfurter in the same case. Picketing's chief strength is
its appeal to sympathy-to class solidarity and vaguer humanitarian
impulses. It is a heavy gun to bring out against the antagonist, particularly as it operates regardless of the merits. But just for that reason
it expresses an alignment of social forces. It makes known demands
which cannot be totally denied without serious danger to the social
18
Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S.
at 317, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
19
Id., 312 U. S. at 293.
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fabric. The schools of thought are likely either to idealize force or to
deny it any validity as an instrument of social construction. The truth
is far more complex. At least, in this context, we might say that a show
of force signifies an underlying reality of power. It may mean to pave
the way for recognition and collaboration. In any case, picketing is
labor's way in a close struggle of appealing to its friends. Entirely to
forbid this appeal to sympathy would, at this time in American history,
be accounted unjust and discriminatory.
"One of the eternal conflicts," said Holmes in Vegelahn v.
Guntner,20 "out of which life is made up is that between the effort
of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of
society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for
the least possible return. Combination on the one side is patent
and powerful. Combi_µation on the other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and
equal way."

1

The Fourteenth Amendment was the appropriate, the available, instrument whereby national wisdom was made to prevail over a dangerous
parochialism.
,
What is to be said then of the paradox that a justice who has been
instrumental in creating the doctrine has been also a leader in limiting
it? I am inclined to believe that the limitations do not constitute a
retreat. They were implied in the original position. The Meadowmoor
and Swing cases, both from Illinois, were decided on the same day.
In the Swing case the defendant picketeers seeking to unionize a beauty
shop did not represent the plaintiff's employees. The Illinois injunction was held "inconsistent with the guarantee of free speech." 21
" ... A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free commtmication by drawing the circle of
economic competition between employers and workers so small as
to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him." 22
In the Meadowmoor 23 case the defendant was a union of drivers
employed by milk distributors. The plaintiff was a distributor which
used the "yendor" system. It sold its milk to "independent" drivers,
167 Mass. 92 at 108, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 at 325, 61 S. Ct. 568
(1941).
22 ld., 312 U.S. at 326.
23 Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local No. 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S.
287, 6J S. Ct. 552 (1941).
20

21
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who in turn sold it to retailers. The retailers sold milk to the consumer
below the current price charged by the regular distributors. The defendants picketed the retail outlets. The Supreme Court of Illinois
enjoined the defendants from picketing and more generally from interfering, discouraging, etc., persons desirous of purchasing milk or
further preventing deliveries to the stores. The Illinois court 24 held
that the stifling of the vendor system was not a proper objective. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Illinois court not on that ground, but
because the picketing was "enmeshed with contemporaneously violent
conduct.... it could justifiably be concluded that the momentum of
fear generated by past violence would survive even though future
picketing might be wholly peaceful." 25
Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, attacked the majority first
because "entanglement with violence" had not been the ground of
decision below. The master in equity, however, had found that persons,
some but not all identified as union members, had committed a number
of violent acts. The Supreme Court of Illinois believed that these acts
"could not help but have the effect of intimidating the persons in front
of whose premises such picketing occurred and of causing them to
believe that non.:.compliance would possibly be followed by acts of an
unlawful character," 26 but it did not treat this finding as necessary for_
its decision.
The majority in affirming apparently acted on the premise that if
the findings are sufficient to support a judgment, the giving of wrong
reasons will not invalidate it. It is my understanding that this premise
is almost universally acknowledged. 21 It seems particularly appropriate when the Supreme Court has in question the validity of a state
judgment. But beneath the surface of this technical justification there
was, I believe, the intention of the majority to seize upon the occasion
as a happy one in which to sketch out in the round the contours of a
doctrine, to indicate the temper and attitude of the Court. It was not
to be simply a question of defining "free speech." The task was to
24

Meadowmoor Dairies v. Mil~ Wagon Drivers Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E.
(2d) 308 (1939).
25
312 U. S. at 292, 294.
26
371 111. at 390.
27
Ri1ey Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55, 61 S. Ct. 95 (1940). To be
sure, the case might have been returned to the Illinois court for an exercise of discretion in view of the theory adopted by the Supreme Court. Cf. Helvering v. Gowran,
302 U. S. 238, 58 S. Ct. 154 (1937). The Court stated that in any case it was
always open to the defendant to move for modification of the injunction.
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work out an adjustment between a minimum national policy and a
legitimate state policy in respect of an activity for which there was
practically no constitutional tradition. It was an occasion also for warning that zeal in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment "in a matter
peculiarly touching the local policy of a state regarding violence tends
to discredit the great immunities of the Bill of Rights." 28
It might be thought that Justice Black showed such zeal in his meticulous analysis of the evidence on the head of violence. The greatest
burst of violence was in 1934. Seven trucks were overturned and five
stores burned or bombed. Picketing was not resumed until eight months
later. Thereafter in 1935, 1936 and 1938 violence was spasmodic and
of lesser degree. The injunction was in 1939. Justice Black's point was
that so much of the violence was in 1934 and so little at a later time.
But then very little ( other than an occasional reminder) was needed.
For the man of ordinary fortitude put under the close surveillance of
picketing, the lesson of a burned store in 1934 and a broken window
in 1937 retains its vividness. Justice Black announced that he was second to none in his devotion to peace and order, but his judgment nevertheless makes the Constitution a barrier to neutralizing the fruits of
violence. It smacks ,of hyperbole to say of the majority's judgment,
as he did, that "it strikes directly at the heart of our government." 29
It is established that an employer has a constitutional right to speak
his thoughts t9 his employees concerning unionism as well as any other
topic. 30 It is equally established that he may not so use his rights as to
put his employees in fear of discharge if they do not heed his preference. In National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co.,31 Justice Murphy, speaking for a unanimous Court, said significantly: "The mere fact that language merges into a course of conduct
does not put that whole cours·e without the range of otherwise applicable administrative power.", I cannot imagine that J1:1stice Black
would find a record of employer violence similar to that in the Meadowmoor case insufficient to warrant injunction of the employer's
speech.32
28 Milk Wagon Drivers Union-, Local No. 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S.
287 at 294, 61 S..Ct. 552 (1941).
29 Id. at 317.
so National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469,
62 S. Ct. 344 (1941).
31 Id., 314 U. S. at 478.
32 No case, as far as I know, specifically enjoins the employer's speaking. H~ is
generally ordered to cease interfering with his employees' rights. Whether a subs~quent speaking was a violation of, the order would arise in a contempt proceeding.
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Justice Reed, dissenting in the Meadowmoor case, takes a bolder
line. "If the fear engendered by past misconduct coerces storekeepers
during peaceful picketing, the remedy lies in the maintenance of order,
not in denial of free speech." 83 This means that if once the state has
been unable to stop violence, it is powerless to deal with conduct which
( under a quite peaceful guise) capitalizes the fear of repetition. Justice
Reed, too, holds no brief for violence. Indeed, freedom of speech, he
implies, is justified because it mitigates the causes of violence. "Our
whole history teaches that adjustment of social relations through reason
is possible while free speech is maintained." 84 Nevertheless, there is
nothing in our history which limits government to the criminal law in
protecting citizens from terror whether past or future. Clearly the
precedents in this situation were to the contrary and the question of the
case was whether these precedents must yield. In Near v. Minnesota
_ex rel. Olson,85 which is the strongest authority against prior restraint
by injunction, the Court says:
" ... The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not 'protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may
have all the e:ffect of force.'"
. The quoted words are from Holmes in Schenck v. United States 86
and cite for authority the injunction in the Gompers case 87 against
blacklisting the plaintiff. Ah, it will be replied, it is just the meaning
of the Thornhill doctrine that those precedents are constitutionally inadmissible from top to bottom. The picketing there was protected because it was speaking. All picketing equally involves speaking. Therefore it is all equally protected.
It has, of course, never been true that all speech is protected from
interference. Justice Holmes has stated it classically in the aphorism
that the right of free speech is not the right to shout "Fire" in a crowded theater; neither is it the right publicly to adjure young men not to
obey the draft law.88 Yet each expression is indisputably a speaking.
The latter, particularly, may be argument based on high and disinterested motives. Each is, nevertheless, punishable because it threatens
88 Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local No. 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S.
287 at 319, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
84
312 U.S. at 320.
85
283 U.S. 697 at 716, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931).
88
249 U.S. 47 at 52 (1919).
87
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 at 439, 31 S. Ct. 492
(1910).
88
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 at 52, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919).
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immediate consequences which, it is thought, an organized political
society is entitled to avoid. Peace, order, objectives specifically established by law-making agencies, may be preserved from direct threat
even at the expense of the institutions making for "social adjustment."
It is natural that a healthy society, as does a healthy person, have
sufficient pride to resist force and defiance. A democratic society such
as ours which permits relatively wide and free discussion may follow
its natural instinct with a goQd conscience. A contrary view exalts
speech above all other social interests. It asks society to take the view
that presumptively the pursuit of any change is to be preferred to all
the other objects to which a government is devoted.
Once it is accepted that the Constitution imposes upon government
no such strained attitude, it becomes merely a question whether a proposed limita~ion is reasonable, whether it has sufficient relation to the
preservation of a permissible objective. It is a prime purpose of government to ensure to everyone a sense of the security of his person,
and his property, and his activity from violence or the threat of violence. Terror is fashionable and respectable today; capitalist, farmer,
laborer is covertly encouraged ( at least by his own class) to use it in
proportion as he believes deeply in his cause. Some of the reasons for
this phenomenon go some way to excuse it, but they do not entitle a
Court in the name of the Constitution to strip government of its
weapons to fight terror. Justice Black talks of Illinois' "vast resources
and powers" 39 for suppressing violence as in the Bethlehem Steel Corporation case 40 he ridiculed the notion that the Government of the
United States could be conceived as yielding to the power of "a private
corporation." This is curious talk from one who has fought lobbies
and organizations, never less powerful than today. The question is
not of a state abstractly capable of any degree of "sovereign" power,
but of this very society made up of great group organizations and limited by them on every side. In Europe great governments with "vast
resources and powers" have fallen, rotted by the fierce heat of terror.
The terrorists ( and those innocent ones who have thrown in their lot
with them) should not be constitutionally privileged to buy, by paying
for their crimes, a right to use them as future capital. It was within
reason to find that the picketing in the Meadowmoor case was being
partly capitalized out of such assets.
39 Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local No. 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312
U.S. 287 at 316, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
40
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289 at 303-305, 61 S. Ct.
581 (1942).
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It is said that the decision will now enable employers through
willing trial judges to trump up specious cases of violence. Review by
the Supreme Court will come too late. This possibility is undeniable.
But it is irrelevant if it once be admitted that the injunction is a reasonable means to cope with the problem of terror. It is true that powers
very likely to be abused have sometimes for that reason been denied,
e.g., wire-tapping. But the denial has ordinarily been achieved by
statute or a very explicit constitutional provision. It is, as Justice Frankfurter intimated, a very strong thing for a Court without fairly explicit
authorization to deny completely to a state a power which has been
exercised for a very long time and which has served as an instrument
in the maintenance of order and general security. It has been thought
particularly ironic that Justice Frankfurter should have been heedless
of the danger, since it was he who with Nathan Greene exposed the
abuses of the labor injunction.41 The inference is that he, like others
who have come to age anq power, has forsaken his earlier lights. It is
true that age and power are very apt to gloss over earlier convictions
inconvenient to their present ends. The reverse face, responsibility, may
rightly or wrongly teach that upon the trustee of public office there are
wider claims than upon the crusader. But there is more to be said for
the justice. Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene wrote a necessary,
a valiant, and an e:ffective book at a time when labor was being systematically suppressed, when each and every item of abuse was bad
as it served the ends of the system. Today there is the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and :finally the doctrine of
the Thornhill case ( modified or not). Beyond that is the great improvement in labor's position and power of which this legislation is in
part the cause and in part the reflection.
It is to my mind disingenuous to speak of the dangers of this injunction exactly in the same tone as if the old system were still in full
force. Justice Frankfurter might easily have done so: it would have
been a mechanical exercise in apparent consistency; above all it would
have won him cheap credit with the group to whom any restriction
whatever of labor activity is presumptively a slap in the face of progress. He saw instead in the role of a constitutional judge a problem
which transcended that of labor's rights. Frankfurter may be unduly
apprehensive of the disruptive forces in universal play just under the
surface of the social fabric; he may attach undue hope to the power
of the state to deal with forces so deeply motivated. It is conceivable too
41

In

THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
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that a touch of private terror may ward off a universal blood bath, but
that view is too speculative to serve as a theory of constitutional law.
Law-enforcing agencies may (in the exercis~ of a wise discretion)
occasionally tolerate a modicum of violence, but it is the common opinion that terror is a dangerous technique of "social adjustment" and
may at any time become progressive rather than preventive. The ordinary man today would hesitate to weaken the forces at the disposal of
government; even more should a judge hesitate to block their path
with the immovable dictates of the Constitution. The Meadowmoor and
Swing cases were, then, an occasion in which the Court might_ place the
Great Seal of the Constitution upon an institution peculiarly adapted to
the expression of labor's aspiration and at the same time warn that
nothing in its doctrine was intended to make violence profitable.
If the Meadowmoor decision is unimpeachable, the more recent
Ritter 42 case is debatable ground and tests more acutely the· meaning
and intention of the Thornhill doctrine. Justice Frankfurter made his
task no easier by his antithesis between picketing pure and picketing
entangled. The former, he seemed to say in the Meadowmoor case,
is a form of the reasoned discussion so dear to the Great Enlightenment. This weakened the support for the judgment in the minds of
persons to whom picketing depends for its effect on factors quite independent of the merits as they might be revealed by discussion. If the
analysis were realistically applied it would seem to bar all picketing;
and the' opinion in the Meadowmoor case is mari:ed by an air of the
disingenuous. The doctrine stands in a clearer and more :flexible light
if the coercive elements in ordinary picketing are understood but are
distinguished as different in degree from the coercion effected through
the apprehension of •violence. In. that way there is- still left open the
question whether these coercive elements, sanctioned to a degree in the
T hornhil~ and Swing cases, may serve as the basis for restriction in
other situations. The antithesis in the Meadowmoor case standing alone
was misleading. If simple picketing was no more than an exercise in
speaking, it was not to be expected that it was material of whom or
where you spoke. Yet already in the Swing case there was an implication that it might be material. Justice Frankfurter said that tlie state
could not draw "the circle of economic competition between employers
and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly
42

Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 3 I 5
U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1940).
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employed by him." 43 The state perhaps might draw the circle around
a certain wider radius. In the Ritter case there were two questions:
first, whether the state could draw any circle at all; secondly, whether
the circle in question was a constitutional circle. The majority answered
both questions in the affirmative. The minority's answer to the second
was clearly no; their ~nswer to the first is not so clear; it may be that
they intended to give none.
Picketing is "more" than free speech. It is talking, communicating,
exhorting, but it is also "patrolling," in the words of Justice Douglas,
and "the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind
or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated." He added, "Hence those aspects of picketing make it
the subject of restrictive regulation." 44 But the next paragraph implied
that the regulation can be no more than an ordinance for "the use of
the streets by all picketeers"-it may not set aside a particular enterprise and "free it from all picketing." None of the judges suggested
that any enterprise could be freed from '"all picketing," so it must be
assumed that Justice Douglas intended to say that under no circumstances whatever could an enterprise be freed ~rom picketing. In the
Ritter case Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy said that injury to a
person's business is "insufficient to justify curtailment of free expression." 45 From these words one could not prophesy whether picketing
as, for example, of a private house, can ever be forbidden. 40 But in
Justice Reed's catalogue of acceptable regulations 47 there was none
going to prohibition. It is, thus, not clear whether the dissenters meant
to lay down the doctrine that the prohibition of peaceful picketing can
under no circumstance be constitutional.
We are led back once more to a consideration of certain fundamen3
~ American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 at 326, 61 S. Ct. 568
(1941) (italics added).
44
In Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769
at 776-777, 62 S. Ct. 816 (1942).
45
Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722 at 731, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1940).
411 In Allen-Bradley Local No. Ill l v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
315 U.S. 740, 62 S. Ct. 820 (1942), the Court unanimously sustained a Wisconsin
injunction against picketing an employee's home as against the claim that it was in
conflict with the federally guaranteed right to bargain collectively; the free speech
issue was stated not to be raised nor decided.
47
Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U. S. 722 at 738, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1940).
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tals of the free speech doctrine. 48 There can be no doubt that in its
origin it was conceived primarily in political terms as a necessary
weapon against governmental tyranny and incompetence, as the sword
of the individual against the oppressions of government. This is the
note struck in the most dramatic reaffirmations of the doctrine-in the
Abrams 49 case, involving as it did a protest by radicals against the aims
of a seated government, and in the late; criminal syndicalism cases.
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 50 involved slander .of the Jewish race,
but the Court noted that the slanders at least pretended to charge
official incompetence; and the case involved as well the-freedom of the
press. In holding unconstitutional the Minnesota statute permitting an
injunction against the repetition of race slander, the Court said:
"The statute is not aimed at the redress of individual or
private wrongs ....
"The statute is directed not simply at the circulation of scandalous and defamatory statements with regard to private citizens,
but at the continued publication by newspapers and periodicals of
charges against public officers of corruption, malfeasance in office,
or serious neglect of duty." 5 1.
Holmes, of course, broadened the meaning of the doctrine so as
to include all "free trade in ideas," but there was nothing to show that
he regarded communication as entirely immune to regulation, regardless of its context. I do not refer only to his decision in the Schenk
case,52 punishing incitement to disobey the draft law. This went to
the point of penalizing the expression of purely political ideas. But in
the course of his opinion, in that case, he cited with approval Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. 53 Freedom of speech "does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have
all the effect of force." 54 That case did not, of course, involve force in
the sense of physical force. The officers of the American Federation of
Labor published in their national organ statements that the plaintiff
was "unfair." The publication was part of a whole course of conduct de48 This article does not purport to sound the general bearings of the free speech
or civil liberties problem. That has been well done recently by Professor Riesman in
his article "Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition," 1942 PUBLIC PoLICY 33.
49 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919).
50
283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931).
5
1. Id., 283 U. S. at 709, 710.
52 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919).
53 221 u. s. 418, 31 s. Ct. 492 (19II).
54
249 U. S. at 52.

PICKETING AS FREE SPEECH

1053

signed to bring the weight of the Federation against the employer or
anyone buying from him or selling his product. This the Court regarded as "an unlawful conspiracy." The "force" to which Holmes
referred 55 is apparently "the vast power [ of the Federation], in the
presence of which the individual may be helpless .... a force not inhering in the words themselves ["unfair," etc.], and therefore exceeding
any possible right of speech which a single individual might have.m 6
In his great dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner,6 1 Holmes started from the
idea ( so intimately associated with his name) that an organized effort
to injure states a cause of action unless there is shown some ground "of
excuse or justification. And I take it to be settled," he continued, "and
rightly settled, that doing that damage by combined persuasion is actionable, as well as doing it by falsehood or by force." 58 As to justification, "The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and
of social advantage."
Holmes thus placed the protection of picketing not on the ground
that communication was as such exempt from regulation, but that for
the case at hand sound policy should make it nonactionable. 59 Holmes
may not then have had in mind the constitutional protection of free
speech, and it is probable, too, that his views on that subject had not
arrived at the noble maturity of the Abrams case. But the sentence
quoted above from the Schenk decision and repeated by the Court in
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen indicates that in the opinion of
Holmes and the Court the protection of free speech did not entirely
exclude the application of either statutory or common-law tort concepts
to activities involving communication. Society should be entitled in
some degree to limit the scope and means of intergroup conflict carried
on by appeals to group loyalty or extragroup sympathy. There is for
example, a movement today to rid business competition of libels
( though true) which have no reference to the business worth of a
competitor.00 It may be imagined that a group of merchants picket
a rival with the placard "Do not buy from non-Christians." It is,
155

However, in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 at 104 et seq., 44 N. E. 1077
( 1896), Holmes believed that the word "force" was proper to describe only physical
force.
56
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 at 439, 31 S. Ct. 492
(1911).
57
167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
58
Id., 167 Mass. at 105, 106 {emphasis added).
59
ld., at 106.
60
See Wolff, "Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement," 47 YALE L. J.
1304 (1938).
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perhaps, futile to forbid such conduct by injunction or otherwise, but
I think a state should be allowed to try. There is a growing disposition
to protect what is vaguely defined as a "right to privacy," no less a
name than Brandeis' being associated with its origin. There is no
occasion here to explore the reach of the doctrine, but it shows itself
often in injunctions which forbid communication, as, for example of
the past life of the plaintiff.61 It would come somewhat as a shock that
not only is such injury no tort, but that it would be unconstitutional to
make it so. It gets back finally to the idea that the protection of "free
speech" is not the absolute protection of everything which can lqgically
be called speech. The protection- must be understood against the background of our constitutional history and the traditions of our legal
system.
Nevertheless, constitutional protection may be extended to new
objects. One of the purposes of free speech is, as Justice Reed said,
to make ~possible peaceful social adjustment_; this may demand protection of new modes of communication. The Thornhill case was a
constitutional recognition of picketing as the voice of labor. It is true
that picketing is int~nded to injure an individual if he does not surrender, but it need not for that reason be outside of the constitutional
protection. Society, if a unit, is nevertheless made up of parts. The
sense of grievance and injustice against an individual -may as much
threaten the state as a grievance against government. It may be felt as
a grievance against the group to which the individual belongs. The
group in turn may be seen as the dominant force in government. These
views are widely held in the very context in question. There was thus
every reason for recognizing that picketing serves the historic function
of free speech. Picketing did not, thereby, cease to have the characteristics which had made it the subject of regulation; it became a question to what extent the end in view in its protection excluded regulation. Conceivably it should exclude all regulation, if the end could
not be otherwise accomplished; but the notion that picketing might be
protected as free speech did n_ot necessarily lead to this conclusion.
Presumptively there was still room for what might be conceived as
a state policy not so wide of the mark as to be unconstitutional. Nothing,
held, at least, in the Thornhill case was contrary, and the Swing case
was carefully phrased to the same effect.
See the exhaustive summary of cases in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., (D. C.
N. Y. 1938} 34 F .. Supp. 19, affd. (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) u3 F. (2d) 806, and the
annotation in 138 A. L. R. 22 (1942) to the Sidis case.
61
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In the Ritter 62 case Justice Frankfurter saw picketing as an aspect
of the "labor dispute." "Labor disputes," he argued, like other disputes
affecting society, are the subject of state regulation; they may not be
entirely immunized simply because communication is involved in the
waging of them. It is true, as I argued above, that serious discussion
usually appeals to sources of persuasion independent of merits (narrowly viewed). Yet picketing, being an instrument of a disciplined
organization, goes beyond most discussion in the extent to which these
sources determine its success and in its tremendous impact on private
individuals. It is not necessarily unreasonable, therefore, for a state
to prohibit the use of this powerful weapon against persons whose connection with the dispute is remote or under circumstances which deeply
offend the community's sense of fairness or value. The validity of this
doctrine can be seen more clearly, I believe, if -it is thought of independently of its application in the Ritter case. There is, for example,
the problem of jurisdictional disputes which have wasted the substance
of both labor and capital and have irritated pub~ic opinion. The practice of certifying the duly chosen representative of the employees lays
the basis for a rational and democratic solution. But picketing by the
defeated union may in the particular case deprive the solution of much
of its value and inflict injury not only on the employer but the employees.68 There is again the picketing of private homes, whether of
employees or employers, a practice which may deeply offend the important sentiments which attach to the home.64 I do not intend here finally
62 Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1940).
68 In Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N. Y. 188,
42 N. E. (2d) 480 (1942), the court interpreted the State Labor Relations Act as
repealing pro tanto the labor anti-injunction statute so as to authorize picketing of
an employer whose employees had chosen to be represented by a rival union. Accord:
R.H. White Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass 510, 38 N. E. (2d) 685 (1942). See Jaffe,
"Inter-Union Disputes in Search of a Forum," 49 YALE L. J. 424 at 454 et seq.
(1940).
64 Thus, statutes have forbidden picketing of an employee's home. Wisconsin State
Labor Relations Law, Wis. Laws (1939), c. 57, § 8, Stat. (1941), § 111.06 (2) (a);
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 28-812; English Trades Disputes & Trade Unions Act, 17
& 18 Geo. V., c. 22, § 3(4) (1927). In Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, 62 S. Ct. 820 (19+2), an order had
been issued under the Wisconsin statute forbidding picketing of an employee's home.
It was sustained against the claim that it was in conflict with the federally guaranteed
right to bargain collectively; the free speech problem was not put in issue.
State courts without a statute have indicated that picketing of a private home
may be forbidden. Cf. State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N. W. 903 (1939)
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to resolve these issues either on constitutional or legisladve grounds,
but it is at least questionable, to my mind, whether the states should be
excluded from developing a policy for such situations, even though a
consequence may be the prohibition of picketing in some instances.
The actual decision in the Ritter case is more dubious. In that case
the Carpenter's Union picketed Mr. Ritter's cafe, because Mr. Ritter
had'engaged a nonunion contractor to put up a building a mile or more
from the cafe. The pickets bore a placard reading: "The Owner of
this Cafe Has Awarded a Contract to Erect a Building to W. A. Plaster Who Is Unfair to the Carpenter's Union ...." "Texas," said Justice
Frankfurter, "has not attempted to protect other business enterprises
of the building contractor, Plaster, who is the petitioners' real adversary." 65 I should think that a union man might rationally regard Mr.
Ritter as a "real" adversary, since by hiring Mr. Plaster he encourages
his nonunion policy. The due process clause, the justice said further,
should not be interpreted to "compel the state to allow the disputants
in a particular industrial episode to conscript neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or the industry in which it arose." 66 The use
of the word "conscript" of course, describes picketing in a very different
and more realistic way than the justice described it in the MeadoU?moor
case. The state should be able to protect neutrals from "conscription."
But is it not arbitrary to classify Ritter as a neutral? If Texas must
rely on Ritter's neutrality its case is difficult to make out.
The Court supplied, however, the additional idea that the business
picketed was not within "the economic context of the dispute." What
was meant by this? Justice Reed, dissenting, took it to mean that the
business picketed is not in the same industry as the primary employer.
Thus there will be raised, he argued, a host of subtle problems concerning the definition of the industry. But this, I think, may be a misconception of the majority's opinion. It is probably even narrower
than Reed suggested. The dispute, as Justice Frankfurter saw it, is
not with an industry but an employer. In the W oh.l 61 case, decided the
same day, it was held that picketing must be permitted of a retail outlet of the employer's product. Here I believe we come close to the
(picketing of an employer's home by a household employee despite state anti-injunction act); Petrucci v. Hogan, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941). ,
65
Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722 at 727, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1940) (italics added).
66
ld., 315 U.S. at 728 (italics added).
61
Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 62
S. Ct. 816 (1942).
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majority's conception. Picketing is protected as a means of expression
in a dispute with an employer concerning the conditions under which
he employs. Picketing is the only effective manner in which to appeal
to the employees and particularly to the customers of the employer.
I take it that if Ritter's Cafe sold nonunion baked goods, picketing of
Ritter's must be permitted. But even so it is the baked goods which
are picketed. The reason that Ritter could not complain is that only
in this way can the customers of the nonunion employer be reached.
In other words, the picketing must be tolerated not merely or perhaps
not at all because the retailer is in a beneficial relation to the primary
employer, but because it is there that the employer's customers exercise
their choice.
It will be argued that this is a narrow and technical conception to
be elevated to the dignity of a constitutional dogma, and that is surely
so. Yet the conception might be said to proceed naturally from the
nature of the problem and the material. Take it on the one hand that
there were compelling reasons for recognizing labor's claim to picket
and that in these times an absolute prohibition would have been unreasonable. Must picketing thus become wholly immune to regulation?
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out, picketing is but an aspect of a labor
dispute. A labor dispute has a number of very serious effects. These
effects are not limited to the employer. They extend as well to his
employees and to the public. They reach their ultimate when the business is shut down. The greater the number of disputes which are pyramided on the primary dispute, the greater is the area of hardship, of
public disturbance, of rancor and recrimination. Justice Black dissenting 68 in the Ritter case pointed out that "Disputes between one or two
unions and one contractor over the merits and justice of union as
opposed to non-union systems of employment are but a part of the
nationwide controversy over the subject." In other words, the area of
dispute may logically be extended to include the whole economy. The
hardships of a labor dispute are to be tolerated in so far as other
objectives demand it, but the society as a whole has an interest, if not
an unlimited right, in balancing the claims made upon it. Any limitation of the area of dispute involves almost inevitably a limitation of
picketing. In the Ritter case the extension was slight, but if the Supreme Court is to leave any leeway to the states in this connection it
must draw a line somewhere. So far it has drawn the line at the pri68
Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U. S. 722 at 730, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1940).
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mary employer and- his product. It need not have been drawn ~o narrowly, and as opinion shifts,69 as the problems to be solved by picketing
change, we can expect to see the line drawn 'in some other way. At
least, the Swing and Wohl cases give a broad and reasonably clear
meaning to the definition of primary employer; they establish on firm
ground the right to picket as an instrument of protesting the policy of
_that employer. It must be admitted. that the cases complicate the free
speech doctrine. I ~ee no escape from that complication unless we are
totally to ignore the relation of communication to action and put communication on a plane of protection superior to all other interests.
Finally, a word as to Justice Frankfurter, for though strictly he
is no part of our subject, it cannot be overlooked that in the attack on
the Meadowmoor and Ritter cases it is his role which has been underlined rather than, let us say, Chief Justice Stone's. And in the end, I
think, this has a bearing on the process involved in these cases. There
are many reasons for the attack on Frankfurter, but this is not the place
to explore them. Shortly, as the member of the majority thought most
likely to be on the other side, his vote has seemed crucial. These votes,
however, are seen by his critics, not in isolation but as indicative of his
whole position. If there were no others in which he had fallen from
grace, they might be excused as temporary aberration. But they are
thought to be part of a total failure to maintain a point of view consistent with the forward social policy which past opinion associated with
his name. It is said that he is, as it were, unhinged by an unreasoning
fear of the forces of violence and revolution. His past and his entire
judicial career, it is not my present intyntion to explor~. It is correct,
however, I believe, to consider his picketing decisions as indicative of
his general temper. In their broad outline they are to my mind a
legitimate expression of a conception of government at once demo. cratic and federal. They involve compromise of pr.inciples, if you will;
but the compromise of competing principles is the sense of our theory
of government. The decisions might properly have gone further in
extending one notion at the expense of the other;- but it is doubtful
if a wider limit would have satisfied those for whom picketing may
be beyond regulation. Justice Frankfurter is not an enemy of labor;
if he were he could hardly have written the Swing or the Hutcheson 10
69

Justice Frankfurter points out that "In forbidding such conscription of neutrals, in the circumstances of the case before us, Texas represents the prevailing, and
probably the unanimous, policy of the states." Id., 3 I 5 U. S. at 728.
70
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941).
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cases, but again it is clear that he is not an exponent of labor. This is all
put down as "confusion," as a lack of "point of view." To those who
hold a simple, explicit system of personal preference, to those who
equate legitimacy with the assumed or apparent interest of a certain'
class, such eclecticism is indeed "confusion."
I confess that these decisions may reflect something more than a
cool, detached conception of constitutional policy. The mind of the
justice may be under the stress of emotional conflict, of forces driving
now to one side, now to the othe~. This was probably less true either
of Holmes or Brandeis. But, then, their temperaments were formed
in a sanguine, secure era. They were tested by great issues, but issues
which for the most part divided the country roughly into two fairly
compact groups, the "conservative" and the "liberal." Today, the
country as a whole moves and acts under the stress of emotional conflict. It is highly sensitive to difference of degree. Where there was
one, there are now many interpretations of the "liberal." Some sense
danger even in a good principle pushed too far. Among these there
will be a difference as to where to draw the line. Still others cannot
have enough of a good principle, and if they do not actually court
danger, hold that it is not too high a price. A judge who senses and
knows within himself this conflict is at least representative. If he has
the wit, the heart, and the honesty, he can make a policy which achieves
a reasonable mediation, though one which is subject to the infirmities
of its virtues. But when this is said, the work of the justice still attests
a high integrity, a devotion to a conception of the constitutional judgeship which is well within the best traditions of a democratic bench.

